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LADY JUSTICE CANNOT HEAR YOUR PRAYERS 
Deborah Ogali* 
 
The Islamic finance industry continues to grow quickly as the appetite for 
everything, from Sharia-compliant home mortgages and car loans to 
sophisticated financial products, increases.  This growth has triggered an 
interest in sukuk, bond-like financial instruments.  And while the 
international market for sukuk has long been dominated by foreign issuers 
and English law, the attraction of a niche market compatible with U.S. 
federal and international securities laws may propel increased participation 
by U.S. issuers and investors who wish to transact under U.S. federal and 
state laws. 
As with all Islamic financial products, sukuk transactions inherently pose 
a Sharia compliance risk.  Thus far, religious compliance has not posed a 
significant barrier to the international market given that most sukuk 
transactions are governed by secular laws that incorporate Sharia law or 
laws that are not averse to interpreting religious law.  U.S. jurisprudence, 
however, has strongly avoided religious questions that would require courts 
to interpret religious doctrines.  While the application of the religious-
question doctrine helps maintain the separation of church and state, it can 
withhold secular judicial remedies from parties to a commercial agreement 
that incorporates religious tenets, such as a sukuk transaction. 
Drawing upon the example of Dana Gas PJSC, a company that sued to 
have its own sukuk certificates declared invalid and related payment 
obligations declared unenforceable due to the transaction’s alleged 
noncompliance with Sharia law, this Note explores the Establishment Clause 
obstacles to adjudication of a similar claim under New York law.  Ultimately, 
this Note concludes that the Establishment Clause bars adjudication of the 
merits of such a dispute and proposes the adoption of legislation, at the state 
and federal level, that would permit secular courts to “certify” religious 
questions to party-selected religious tribunals.  Pending passage of such 
litigation, commercial parties are encouraged to utilize alternative dispute 
resolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implicit in every contract is the availability of a judicial remedy.1  The 
presumed authority of courts to intervene in a contract dispute gives teeth to 
the threat of consequences for a breach of contract.  Otherwise, parties would 
only be incentivized to perform their contractual obligations by reputational 
and reputation-related economic considerations.2  A world in which a harmed 
party cannot sue a breaching party to recover damages3 runs counter to the 
history of common-law breach of contract, wherein a valid agreement 
demands performance or damages.4  For parties whose contract dispute 
touches on religious matters, however, the possibility that a breach will not 
 
 1. The concept of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including arbitration or 
mediation, is premised on the notion that such disputes could otherwise be adjudicated in a 
court. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism:  
Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (2011) (recognizing 
that an arbitration agreement “demonstrate[s] [the parties’] consent to exit the realm of 
standard legal adjudication”). 
 2. See Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1679, 1685 & n.18 (2008) (noting that certain business communities rely on 
reputation, not damages, to enforce contracts). 
 3. This premise assumes the claim is not otherwise barred by statutes of limitations, ADR 
agreements, or for lack of standing. 
 4. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 919–20 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Virtually every contract operates, not as a guarantee of particular future conduct, 
but as an assumption of liability in the event of nonperformance . . . .”). 
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be remedied is an ever-present reality.5  As a matter of faith, the Bible may 
correctly claim that the “effective, fervent prayer of a righteous man avails 
much.”6  As a matter of law, a plaintiff with a religious claim may only pray 
for divine justice because a court will likely not hear the case. 
This legal conundrum is not the byproduct of anti-religion bias, but of 
courts’ strict adherence to the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.7  By 
denying courts the authority to adjudicate religious disputes, states seemingly 
abide by the Founding Fathers’ vision of a nation free of religious tyranny.8  
What is less clear, however, is how the Founding Fathers would have reacted 
to the fact that this free-religion paradise slams shut the doors of secular 
justice for those whose deeply held religious beliefs permeate every facet of 
their lives, including their contracts.  When an agreement incorporates 
religious obligations, the parties risk that, no matter the breach or the wrong, 
the Establishment Clause will bar a court from deciding the merits of the 
dispute.9 
When a dispute arises under a commercial agreement that was drafted to 
accord with religious beliefs, the judicial remedies available are limited.10  
Courts in general, and New York courts in particular, have an interest in both 
resolving commercial disputes11 and promoting the free exercise of 
religion.12  These interests conflict when a commercial dispute is also a 
religious dispute.  Considering courts’ limited authority to resolve religious 
disputes, this Note examines the legal obstacles that parties face in 
adjudicating religious disputes arising from commercial agreements 
governed by secular law, specifically in the context of the quickly growing 
Islamic finance industry.  This Note focuses on the adjudication of disputes 
in which a party to a commercial financial agreement governed by New York 
law seeks excuse from its obligations due to the agreement’s noncompliance 
 
 5. See Shai Silverman, Before the Godly:  Religious Arbitration and the U.S. Legal 
System, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 719, 720, 722 (2017) (noting that U.S. courts cannot decide matters 
of religious law). 
 6. James 5:16 (New King James). 
 7. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment has been incorporated against the states. Sch. Dist. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). 
 8. Steven K. Green, A “Spacious Conception”:  Separationism as an Idea, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 443, 473 (2006) (noting that the Founders were concerned with avoiding religious 
tyranny when enacting the First Amendment). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. Generally, a court will either find a religious dispute nonjusticiable or it will minimize 
the religious nature of the dispute to permit adjudication. See infra Part II for a discussion of 
the Establishment Clause and neutral principles of law, and see also Michael A. Helfand, 
Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul:  Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 157, 159–60 (2011), which outlines the choices courts face when adjudicating 
religious disputes. 
 11. See Jack M. Graves, Party Autonomy in Choice of Commercial Law:  The Failure of 
Revised U.C.C. § 1-301 and a Proposal for Broader Reform, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 59, 117–
18 (2005); see also infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465–66 
(N.Y. 2006). 
1296 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
with religious requirements.  Although this Note presents resolutions 
currently available under New York law, it ultimately proposes a legislative 
remedy that would permit a court to “certify” religious questions to a 
religious tribunal and retain jurisdiction over the secular aspects of a 
commercial dispute.13 
Part I introduces investment financing, Sharia law, and Islamic finance.  It 
continues with an overview of Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd.,14 
which involved related cases in the United Kingdom, British Virgin Islands, 
and United Arab Emirates15 and presents significant questions for U.S. 
entities involved in the Islamic finance industry.  This litigation forms the 
basis for the hypothetical litigation this Note addresses.  Part II examines the 
implications of the Establishment Clause in secular adjudication of religious 
disputes, including likely outcomes for parties seeking judicial recourse for 
religious commercial disputes.  Specifically, this Part analyzes likely 
outcomes under New York law for a party seeking equitable rescission based 
on mutual mistake of fact and concludes that the Establishment Clause 
definitively bars the resolution of disputes in which a party seeks rescission 
due to an agreement’s noncompliance with religious obligations that were 
intended to form the basis of the agreement.  Part III presents alternatives 
currently available under New York law that skirt the Establishment Clause 
and provide a forum for parties to resolve their disputes.  Ultimately, this 
Note contends that alternative dispute resolution (ADR), while satisfactory, 
is not an ideal solution for parties whose disputes are both religious and 
commercial.  Instead, it proposes a legislative remedy that would permit 
secular courts to certify religious questions to a religious tribunal of the 
parties’ choosing.  In so doing, a secular court would retain authority to hear 
the dispute while avoiding excessive religious entanglement that would 
violate the Establishment Clause.16  Nevertheless, in acknowledging 
potential barriers to timely enactments of legislation permitting religious 
certification,17 this Note concludes that parties who choose to incorporate 
religious beliefs into commercial agreements should also include ADR 
provisions in those agreements.  ADR provisions help ensure that religious 
parties can contract according to their beliefs while maintaining an avenue 
for legal recourse and resolution of the merits of their dispute—an outcome 
presently unavailable in secular judicial courts.18 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928. 
 15. Id. at [25]–[27]. 
 16. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of excessive entanglement under the Establishment 
Clause. 
 17. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 18. Although ADR provisions are generally upheld, a court may find an ADR provision 
unenforceable. See Judith Resnick, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2839 n.165, 
2886 & n.397 (2015) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has not held that an arbitration 
provision was inadequate, inaccessible, or ineffective, but state courts occasionally strike 
arbitration provisions on grounds of unconscionability or inadequate vindication).  For parties 
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I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKING 
It is important to understand the terminology and elementary investment 
principles that appear throughout this Note.  Part I.A begins with a basic 
introduction to Western19 securities, bond offerings, and investment 
financing.  Part I.B introduces general principles of Sharia law pertaining to 
Islamic contracts.  Part I.C explains the Islamic finance industry, including 
its development and standards, with a focus on tradeable Islamic financial 
instruments.  Part I.D briefly reviews the Dana Gas dispute, and Part I.E 
highlights the implications of the Dana Gas dispute for American issuers and 
investors. 
A.  Western Investment Financing 
Western investments often involve the sale and purchase of securities.20  
A “security” is generally defined as a tradeable financial instrument with 
monetary value, but the term can also refer to any contract or arrangement 
that involves a monetary investment in a common enterprise that is expected 
to yield profits solely from a third party’s efforts.21  Issuers offer securities 
to raise capital22 and generally characterize the security as equity or debt.23  
The most common equity and debt instruments are stocks and bonds, 
respectively.  As an equity instrument, a share of stock represents an 
ownership interest in an issuer’s company,24 whereas a bond represents a 
debt obligation payable by the issuer to the bondholder.25  Moreover, a 
security can be traded on a public exchange or sold to a restricted group of 
private investors.26 
 
to a religious dispute, striking an ADR provision would leave the parties without an 
enforceable avenue of resolution. 
 19. “Western” will refer to American and English systems, as distinguished from their 
Islamic counterparts. 
 20. This Note does not address alternative investments, which generally refer to 
investments that fall outside stocks and bonds. H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck, Alternative 
Investments:  An Overview, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS:  INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE, 
BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES 3, 3 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013). 
 21. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99, 301 (1946); ALAN N. 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 246, 248 n.28 (2d ed. 2014).  
A security can include, but is not limited to, a note, stock, treasury stock, security future, 
security-based swap, bond, or debenture. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); W. J. Howey, 328 
U.S. at 297 n.3. 
 22. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 46–47.  The issuer is the entity that creates the 
security. Id. 
 23. Id.  Securities may also include hybrid financial instruments, with equity, debt, or 
derivative instrument features, but a detailed overview of financial instruments is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  For more, see generally JASON A. PEDERSEN, THE WALL STREET PRIMER:  
THE PLAYERS, DEALS, AND MECHANICS OF THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKET (2009), and 
RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21. 
 24. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 49.  In addition to an ownership interest in the 
asset, the stockholder may receive dividend payments from the profits generated by the asset. 
Id. 
 25. Id. at 128. 
 26. Id. at 144–45. 
1298 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
While a stock issuer can only be a company, a bond issuer may be a 
company or a sovereign governmental entity.27  In addition to widening 
access to capital-raising opportunities, a bond offering allows an issuer to 
borrow capital in a manner that is generally less restrictive and less expensive 
than a bank loan.28  Issuers of bonds have greater flexibility to operate as they 
choose because they are not subject to the restrictive covenants that usually 
accompany bank loans.29  Bond offerings do not dilute company ownership 
or give bondholders voting rights that enable them to control the issuer.30  
Bondholders are creditors of the issuer, and in the event that the issuer 
becomes insolvent or bankrupt, the bondholders may have a priority claim 
on the issuer’s assets.31 
Although investors can enter the financial market individually, many seek 
collective investments that provide access to a broader range of 
opportunities, better management expertise, and lower costs.  For example, 
many investors will use a pooled investment vehicle, such as an investment 
fund.32  In an investment fund, investors do not make the day-to-day 
investment decisions, but they entrust those decisions to an investment 
manager.33  Investors select a fund based on targeted returns, risk, 
management expertise, and management fees.34  A private equity fund is 
often structured as a limited partnership (LP), in which the investors are the 
limited partners.35  To join an LP, an investor must execute a subscription 
 
 27. Id. at 46. 
 28. William W. Bratton, Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice, 11 CAP. 
MARKETS L.J. 461, 478–80 (2016).  A bond’s cost depends on factors such as coupon rate, 
maturity date, and redemption options. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128.  A coupon rate 
is the contractual interest rate on the bond. Coupon, A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING 
(6th ed. 2018).  The coupon rate may be fixed or variable.  A fixed rate is a set interest rate 
that does not change regardless of interest rate fluctuations in the market. Fixed Rate, A 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018).  A variable rate, also known as a 
floating rate, is based on a market-index rate, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR). Floating Interest Rate, A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018).  
LIBOR is the interest rate at which banks lend money to each other for short-term loans in the 
London intermarket. London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE 
AND BANKING (6th ed. 2018).  The maturity date is the date on which the principal and interest 
must be repaid in full to the bondholder. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128.  Redemption 
options may allow an issuer to repay the principal before the maturity date or allow a 
bondholder to redeem the principal before the maturity date. Id. at 128–29.  An issuer’s credit 
rating is determined by independent agencies, including Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Fitch, based on the issuer’s financial position. Id. at 129. 
 29. Bratton, supra note 28, at 478–80. 
 30. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 21, at 128. 
 31. Id. at 128. 
 32. See Harry Cendrowski & Adam A. Wadecki, Introduction to Private Equity, in 
PRIVATE EQUITY:  HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 3, 5 (Harry Cendrowski et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2012).  Although there are several types of investment funds, this Note focuses on 
the private equity fund structure.  Private equity investments are considered a type of 
alternative investment, as contrasted with traditional investments such as stocks and bonds, 
and generally are not traded on a public exchange. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. Id. at 23. 
 35. Id. at 5. 
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agreement that specifies the investor’s contribution to the fund.36  The LP, in 
turn, executes an investment management agreement with an entity with 
investing expertise.37  The investment manager controls the fund’s 
investments, subject to any restrictions specified in the governing documents, 
including assets acquired, duration of holdings, and disposition of holdings.38  
The fund generally has a limited lifecycle,39 during which the investment 
manager invests the fund’s capital for a defined period of time to generate 
the targeted financial returns for the fund and its investors.40  At the end of 
the fund’s lifecycle, the investment manager disposes of the fund’s assets, 
returns the investors’ investment, and provides the investors with fees, profit 
splits, and guaranteed returns, if any.41 
B.  Sharia Law Limitations on Contract Formation 
Sharia42 is the divine law of Islam and covers topics ranging from religious 
practices to contracts.  Islamic law is derived from four sources:  the Qur’an, 
Sunna, ijma‘, and qiyas.43  The Qur’an and Sunna are revered as sources of 
divine revelation, while ijma‘ reflects community consensus, and qiyas 
reflects logical reasoning, most commonly in the form of reasoning by 
analogy.44  A fatwa is a formal Islamic legal opinion and is generally issued 
when a novel legal question arises.45  Fatwas are routinely issued by Sharia 
 
 36. See TIMOTHY SPANGLER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS 89 (3d ed. 2018). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Cendrowski & Wadecki, supra note 32, at 12.  Private equity funds may invest in 
private companies or buy out public companies. See id. at 4.  The fund may hold and improve 
an asset with the goal of selling the asset later at a significant profit, such as a low-performing 
company whose business operations are optimized before being sold at a profit. Id. at 21–22. 
 39. Id. at 12. The fund’s lifecycle is usually defined in the fund’s limited partnership 
agreement. Id. 
 40. See id. at 8, 12. 
 41. Id. at 10. 
 42. There are two distinct branches within Islam—Sunni and Shi‘a—which differ, largely, 
on the line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad.  To the extent there are any doctrinal 
or practical differences, this Note will enunciate the Sunni perspective because the Sunni 
branch dominates the Islamic finance industry. David M. Eisenberg, Sources and Principles 
of Islamic Law, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE 15, 30–31 (Craig R. Nethercott & 
David M. Eisenberg eds., 2012).  Islamic jurisprudence comprises human interpretations of 
the divine law and includes substantive principles.  The sources used to elaborate on the 
substantive principles are known as fiqh. Cynthia Shawamreh, The Legal Framework of 
Islamic Finance, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC FINANCE:  INNOVATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND 
BEST PRACTICES 39, 39 (Karen Hunt-Ahmed ed., 2013).  Sharia is considered unlimited and, 
therefore, unknowable. Id. 
 43. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 17–18. 
 44. Id.; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 40–41.  The Qur’an, which Muslims believe was 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by Allah directly, was standardized during the third Sunni 
caliph and is generally accepted in its current standardized form. Shawamreh, supra note 42, 
at 40.  The Sunna, compiled during the ninth century, is a collection of the recounted actions 
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, known collectively as hadith. Eisenberg, supra note 
42, at 22–23.  Islamic scholars agree on the text of the Qur’an and Sunna. Shawamreh, supra 
note 42, at 41. 
 45. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 29. 
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supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions regarding general 
practices or the Sharia compliance of specific products or transactions.46 
Islam highly values the concept of personal ownership of property.47  As 
such, Islamic contracting principles aim to reduce or eliminate exploitative 
or risky behaviors that would unduly deprive one of property.48  When 
entering an Islamic contract, there are a few general governing principles.  
One of the most important principles is the prohibition of riba, unjustified 
increase.49  While the full boundaries of riba are still disputed in Islamic 
scholarship,50 there is general consensus that it prohibits any payment or 
receipt of interest.51  Since Islam does not recognize the time value of money, 
money alone cannot increase or decrease in value without being linked to an 
asset.52  Next, Islamic law prohibits transactions involving excessive gharar, 
or uncertainty.53  Gharar is implicated in any transaction where the value of 
the subject matter cannot be determined at the time the agreement is 
executed, such as in a purchase agreement for grain from a specific field that 
has not yet been harvested.54  Most transactions involve a degree of gharar,55 
but excessive gharar voids a contract.56  Lastly, the subject matter of Islamic 
contracts cannot involve haram, or forbidden, activities.57 
C.  Primer on Islamic Finance 
In keeping with Islamic contracting concerns about exploitation and 
excessive gharar, Islamic finance is based on a risk-sharing model.58  This 
model directly contradicts the Western interest rate–based system that 
guarantees a return for the lender.59  Because the traditional model demands 
repayment even if the borrower is unable to pay, Islam views interest rate–
based systems as unjust and exploitative.60  Instead, Islamic finance uses a 
 
 46. Id. at 30. 
 47. See SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW AND ISLAM:  PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 11–13 (2006). 
 48. See id. at 11. 
 49. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 47. 
 50. This Note does not focus on the intricacies of the scholarly debates regarding riba and 
does not delve into the distinctions in types of riba or competing interpretations. 
 51. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 41; Atif Hanif & Julian Johansen, Sukuk, in ISLAMIC 
FINANCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 254, 259.  This principle prohibits the use of 
credit cards with interest rates or penalty rates for late payments of debt. ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SHARI’AH STANDARDS 80, 95 
(2015) [hereinafter AAOIFI]. 
 52. See SAIT & LIM, supra note 47, at 12. 
 53. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 45. 
 54. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 50.  Advance sales of crops are permissible where the 
quantity and quality are predetermined. Id. 
 55. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 45. 
 56. Id. at 47–48. 
 57. See AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 642 (noting that Sharia-impermissible activities include 
those relating to alcohol, drugs, gambling, pork, prostitution, nightclubs, and statues); see also 
Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 45. 
 58. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 45. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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system of profit and loss sharing, in which parties are less likely to be 
exploited by one another because the risk of nonpayment is spread among all 
parties.61  As with individual contracts, any financed business activity must 
also comport with Islamic standards.62 
Just as stocks and bonds may be the most recognizable Western financial 
instruments, the most well-known Islamic financial instrument is the sakk.63  
In 1988, the Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference held that “any combinations of assets . . . can be represented in 
the form of written financial instruments” and thus opened the door for the 
modern sukuk market.64  Presently, the Sharia Board of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) defines 
sukuk as “certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets.”65  AAOIFI, formed in 1991, promulgates 
Sharia standards for Islamic financial transactions.66  In its relatively short 
history, AAOIFI has established itself as an authority on standards of Sharia 
compliance for financial transactions.67 
In 2007, the chairman of AAOIFI’s Sharia Board, Sheikh Muhammad 
Taqi Usmani, published a paper criticizing sukuk structures that he believed 
created impermissible debt obligations despite facial compliance with 
Islamic principles.68  Usmani’s paper led to the issuance of revised AAOIFI 
Sharia standards in 2008 and an industry-wide shakeup in the structuring of 
Islamic financial transactions.69 
Although sukuk are commonly referred to as Islamic bonds, they provide 
the owner with an equity interest.70  Like an issuer offering bonds, an 
originator raising capital forms an incorporated special-purpose vehicle 
(SPV) that issues the sukuk certificates.71  As in a private equity fund, 
investors subscribe and purchase the sukuk certificates.72  The cash from the 
subscription is used by the SPV to purchase the target assets or finance the 
business activity.73  As equity instruments, the certificates represent an 
ownership interest in the underlying assets.74  Like a bond’s coupon 
payments, sukuk generate periodic payments to investors, which constitute 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  Therefore, Islamic financial transactions cannot relate to trade in forbidden 
products, such as pork, alcohol, drugs, or pornography. 
 63. Sakk is an Arabic word that translates to “deed” or “instrument.” Hanif & Johansen, 
supra note 51, at 255.  The plural form of sakk is sukuk. Id.  Historically, sakk referred to any 
document that represented a financial liability. Id. at 255. 
 64. Id. at 256. 
 65. AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 468. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. Id. at 11. 
 68. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 257. 
 69. Id. at 256; see infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 70. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 259. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 258–59; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 53. 
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either rent or installment sale payments,75 and return the investors’ capital 
with a profit when available.76  While the periodic payments are calculated 
using a profit rate rather than an interest rate, like a bond’s coupon rate, the 
profit rate is often benchmarked against a market index, such as LIBOR.77  
Unlike a bond, investors are not guaranteed recovery of their capital, much 
less a profit.78  If the asset underperforms and generates a loss, all parties, 
including the investors, bear the loss.79  This important feature satisfies the 
risk-sharing model of Islamic finance. 
The Islamic finance industry generally employs eight common sukuk 
structures based on investment goals.80  Of these, sukuk al-wakala and al-
mudaraba resemble the traditional investment fund arrangement, in which 
the fund manager manages assets or a portfolio of assets.81  Sukuk al-
mudaraba best replicates a limited partnership agreement.82  The rabb al-
mal, the financier, contributes capital but does not participate in the business 
activities of the venture, while the mudarib, the sponsor, manages the 
business activities but does not contribute capital.83  Thus, the rabb al-mal 
and mudarib mirror the roles of limited partners and investment managers.84  
In the event of asset underperformance, the rabb al-mal bears the financial 
loss, while the mudarib loses the value of his labor.85  Sukuk al-musharaka 
resembles a joint venture in which all parties contribute funds and may 
actively participate in the business.86  Profits and losses are distributed 
according to a predetermined ratio,87 similar to pro rata distributions in 
Western investment funds. 
 
 75. The source of the funding of the periodic payments—whether rent or installment sale 
payments—will depend on the structure of the sukuk. 
 76. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 53. 
 77. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256.  See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of traditional bond offerings. 
 78. See AAOIFI, supra note 51, at 477. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 258.  See generally ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, for detailed discussions of the eight common sukuk structures:  
(1) al-ijara, (2) al-musharaka, (3) al-istithmar, (4) al-manafa’a, (5) al-istisna‘, (6)  al-wakala, 
(7) al-mudaraba, al-manafa’a, and (8) al-murabaha. 
 81. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional 
investment funds.  A mudaraba agreement is akin to an investment management agreement.  
Contrast this with sukuk al-murabaha, which most resemble conventional loan financing and 
are generally nontradeable on the secondary market because they are considered debt 
receivables. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52.  Sukuk al-murabaha structures are generally 
disfavored in the Islamic market, as some consider the use of al-murabaha to be a facial 
workaround of the principles of Islamic finance. Id.; see also Craig R. Nethercott, Murabaha 
and Tawarruq, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 192, 200–01. 
 82. Julian Johansen & Atif Hanif, Musharaka and Mudaraba, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 174, 184–85; Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52. 
 83. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52. 
 84. See supra notes 33–41 for a description of a typical private equity investment fund 
structure. 
 85. Johansen & Hanif, supra note 82, at 185. 
 86. Shawamreh, supra note 42, at 52. 
 87. Id. 
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Sheikh Usmani’s 2007 fatwa challenged the Sharia compliance of 80 
percent of the then-issued sukuk and particularly implicated al-mudaraba and 
al-musharaka structures.88  Usmani stated that the structures impermissibly 
guaranteed repayment on maturity and, instead, should behave as equity 
instruments for appropriate profit and loss sharing.89  Like bond issuers, 
sukuk originators or sponsors tend to be Islamic financial institutions but can 
include individual companies or sovereign governmental entities.90  While 
sukuk issuances have been slow to gain popularity in the United States, there 
have been several issuances by American entities engaged in international 
markets.91 
To have a sukuk issuance declared Sharia compliant, the parties must first 
obtain a fatwa from a board of Islamic scholars, who confirm the instruments 
are Sharia compliant.92  These scholars base their decision on Islamic 
jurisprudence and consensus with one another.93  There are no regulations or 
authoritative canonical laws that set forth exact parameters for compliance.94  
The originator may retain these scholars in its normal course of business or 
for the specific purpose of evaluating the transaction.95  Beyond the lack of 
standardized contemporary Islamic financial practices, different schools of 
Islamic scholarship dominate in different geographic areas, which means that 
compliance determinations are often regional.96 
D.  Case Study:  Dana Gas 
In 2017, Dana Gas PJSC, an Emirati natural gas company,97 became 
embroiled in litigation that threatened to rock the Islamic finance industry.  
 
 88. Rahail Ali, Islamic Finance and Documentation, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE 91, 106 (Rahail Ali ed., 2d ed. 2014); Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256; Matthew 
Martin et al., Dana Gas Is Said to Miss Payment on $700 Million Sukuk Today, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 31, 2017, 7:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/dana-gas-
is-said-to-miss-payment-on-700-million-sukuk-tomorrow [https://perma.cc/WK5U-Q5TG]. 
 89. See Martin et al., supra note 88. 
 90. Hanif & Johansen, supra note 51, at 256–57 (noting that a Malaysian plantation 
company issued the first international sukuk, followed by sovereign issuances by Malaysia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, and Dubai). 
 91. Id. at 267 (noting sukuk issuance and default by East Cameron Partners, an American 
oil and gas company); UPDATE 1—Goldman Sachs Gets Strong Demand for Landmark 
Sukuk Issue, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/goldman-
sukuk-launch/update-1-goldman-sachs-gets-strong-demand-for-landmark-sukuk-issue-idUS 
L6N0RH2RH20140916 [https://perma.cc/BJ6R-BUGF] (announcing sukuk issuance by 
Goldman Sachs, an American bank); UPDATE 1—US’ GE Capital Raises $500 Mln in Debut 
Islamic Bond, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2009, 9:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/gecapital-
bonds/update-1-us-ge-capital-raises-500-mln-in-debut-islamic-bond-idUSLJ417751200 
91119 [https://perma.cc/ZAP8-2NCD] (announcing General Electric’s sukuk issuance as the 
first sukuk issuance by a large U.S. conglomerate). 
 92. Ali, supra note 88, at 26. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 26–27. 
 95. Id. at 26. 
 96. Id. at 27 (noting that the Sha’afi school dominates in Malaysia but the Hanbali school 
dominates in Saudi Arabia and several Gulf Cooperation Council countries). 
 97. Overview, DANA GAS, http://www.danagas.com/en-us/about/overview 
[https://perma.cc/PMZ2-R7WF] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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Dana Gas issued 1 billion U.S. dollars’ worth of sukuk certificates, structured 
as an al-mudaraba arrangement.98  The certificates originally bore an 
October 2012 maturity date99 but were restructured to extend the maturity 
date to October 31, 2017.100  In early 2017, the company faced liquidity 
problems due to decreased global gas prices and delayed payments from its 
debtors and subsequently announced it wanted to restructure the certificates 
again.101  At the time, approximately $700 million of the sukuk certificates 
were outstanding.102 
In June 2017, the company shocked the industry by announcing that its 
religious advisors concluded that the outstanding sukuk certificates were not 
compliant with Sharia law.103  To bring the certificates into compliance, 
Dana Gas proposed an exchange of the outstanding certificates for Sharia-
compliant certificates that further extended the maturity date and reduced the 
profit rate payable.104  Additionally, Dana Gas announced that it would not 
pay the remaining periodic distributions due under the purchase undertaking 
agreement because of the purported noncompliance with religious law.105  
Doubling down on its assertion, Dana Gas sought and obtained injunctions 
in Emirati, British Virgin Islander, and U.K. courts to prevent any action 
from being taken against the certificates, including the triggering of default 
events when Dana Gas failed to make its periodic payments.106  On October 
31, 2017, Dana Gas did not redeem its matured sukuk certificates, but the 
injunctions prevented investors from declaring a default event.107  The Dana 
Gas purchase undertaking agreement, which contains the payment obligation 
provisions, was governed by English law, while the assets backing the 
transaction and the underlying mudaraba agreement were subject to Emirati 
law, which wholly incorporates Sharia law.108  The thrust of Dana Gas’s legal 
 
 98. Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [5], [10]; see 
supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 99. Anthony Dipaola, Dana Gas to Start Restructuring Talks on Bond Due in October, 
BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2017, 3:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-
03/dana-gas-to-start-restructuring-talks-on-bond-due-in-october [https://perma.cc/4GFS-
KWRW]. 
 100. See Davide Barbuscia, UAE’s Dana Gas Leaves Maturing Sukuk Unpaid but No 
Default Declared—Sources, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/dana-
gas-sukuk/uaes-dana-gas-leaves-maturing-sukuk-unpaid-but-no-default-declared-sources-
idUSL8N1N60IT [https://perma.cc/FF5B-7BM8]. 
 101. Andy Critchlow, Islamic Titanic, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.breakingviews.com/considered-view/dana-gas-is-the-tip-of-islamic-bond-
iceberg/ [https://perma.cc/MP9Q-3648]; Dipaola, supra note 99. 
 102. Dipaola, supra note 99. 
 103. Arif Sharif, Why Everyone’s Talking About Dana Gas’s Sukuk, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 
2017, 4:12 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-15/dana-gas-s-move-
to-void-sukuk-stuns-analysts-who-question-motive [https://perma.cc/NJC9-5D6B]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Barbuscia, supra note 100.  Under the governing documents, in the event of a default, 
Dana Gas was required to purchase the underlying assets at a predetermined “Exercise Price.”  
Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [15]. 
 108. Sharif, supra note 103. 
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argument was a mistaken-fact claim and an illegality defense:  (1) the parties 
were mistaken about the certificates’ compliance with Sharia law, and 
(2) because the certificates were not compliant with Sharia law, the then-
existing obligations were illegal under Emirati law.  Though Dana Gas did 
not believe its lawsuits would have a significant impact on the market, the 
legal questions posed by these suits may nevertheless impact the stability and 
growth of the Islamic finance industry.109 
E.  Dana Gas’s Implications for U.S. Capital Markets 
Although several American entities have issued sukuk,110 the transaction 
agreements are generally governed by a foreign, secular law.111  However, 
New York law has proven a highly desirable choice for domestic commercial 
transactions.112  New York has a storied history as an important commercial 
center with a strong body of commercial law.113  New York’s substantive 
law is especially attractive for financial contracts.114  The substantive law 
and New York’s establishment of a commercial division of its court system 
increase New York’s attractiveness as a choice of law and forum.115  Thus, 
it is possible that a dispute concerning sukuk could arise under New York 
law, particularly for U.S. issuers.  To date, only one sukuk issuance is 
governed by American law,116 but as the market continues to expand, there 
 
 109. Barbuscia, supra note 100.  The English courts ultimately held that even if the 
agreements were not compliant with Sharia law, under English law, the risk of noncompliance 
had been allocated to Dana Gas. Dana Gas, [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [75]–[77].  Further, 
even if the payments would be illegal in the United Arab Emirates, they were not illegal in the 
place of performance. Id. at [80].  Thus, Dana Gas could not avoid its payment obligations.  
Dana Gas eventually reached a restructuring deal with its sukuk holders. Andrew Torchia, 
UPDATE 1—UAE’s Dana Gas Agrees $700 Mln Sukuk Restructuring Deal, REUTERS (May 
13, 2018, 7:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/dana-gas-sukuk/update-1-uaes-dana-
gas-agrees-700-mln-sukuk-restructuring-deal-idUSL5N1SK090 [https://perma.cc/676X-
S8PJ]; see also Press Release, Dana Gas, Dana Gas Shareholders Support US$700 Million 
Consensual Sukuk Restructuring (June 21, 2018), http://www.danagas.com/en-us/media-
center/press-releases/press-release-details?ID=291 [https://perma.cc/NU46-ZWU]. 
 110. See supra note 91. 
 111. While English law is the preferred choice of law for international sukuk transactions, 
Sharia-incorporating laws are often the preferred choice for domestic issuances. Hanif & 
Johansen, supra note 51, at 266. 
 112. See supra note 111; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to 
New York:  An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-
Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1489 (2009) (finding that New York 
was the choice of law in 46 percent of 2865 contract samples derived from Form 8-K filings). 
 113. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 112, at 1482. 
 114. Id. at 1486. 
 115. Id. at 1485–87.  Commercial Division justices and court personnel are selected for 
their expertise in business law. Id. at 1486. 
 116. Michigan-based University Bank issued a $2.5 million perpetual sukuk with a 5.75 
percent profit rate.  The underlying agreement is governed by New York law. Linklaters 
Advises on the First Sukuk Issued Under United States Law, LINKLATERS (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.linklaters.com/en/about-us/news-and-deals/deals/2016/linklaters-advises-on-
the-first-sukuk-issued-under-united-states-law [https://perma.cc/7Q2L-3J58]; University 
Bank Issues $2.5 Million 5.75% Perpetual Note, MKT. WIRED (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/university-bank-issues-25-million-575-
perpetual-note-otcqb-unib-2112602.htm [https://perma.cc/2JGC-CT9Z]. 
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will likely be future issuances governed by U.S. state law.  And although 
Dana Gas ultimately lost its dispute on other grounds,117 there is a fear that 
the company’s actions may inspire other sukuk issuers seeking to renege on 
their payment obligations to have the underlying agreement declared 
unenforceable based on religious interpretations and related industry 
standards. 
The existence of the Islamic financial industry is a response to a need for 
Sharia-compliant financial products.118  By participating in this specialized 
market, parties bargain for a financing arrangement that complies with 
certain religious requirements.  This compliance is important enough that 
parties accept the increased cost of transacting in Islamic financial 
products.119  It is not unreasonable for a party, willing to pay a higher price 
for a Sharia-compliant investment, to seek to exit a transaction after learning 
that the bargained-for subject matter does not exist.  Had the parties desired 
a financing arrangement that ignored religious norms, they could have 
availed themselves of well-established Western capital markets, which often 
carry tax benefits.120  Thus, it is possible that a situation like that of Dana 
Gas—in which one party believes the certificates are not compliant with 
religious law, but the counterparty disagrees—could arise and a party would 
seek release from its obligations. 
II.  SECULAR VERSUS DIVINE:  A COURT’S JURISDICTION 
TO RESOLVE RELIGIOUS COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
The payment obligations in sukuk transactions are contained in a purchase 
undertaking agreement, which generally relies on underlying agreements to 
provide the requisite triggers and avenues for performance of obligations.121  
Therefore, the validity of the purchase undertaking agreement depends, in 
part, on the validity of the underlying transaction agreements, including any 
investment management agreements.122  Where a party seeks avoidance by 
virtue of the transaction’s noncompliance with Sharia law, the challenge 
would likely be to the compliance of the underlying agreements rather than 
the purchase undertaking agreement itself.123 
 
 117. See supra note 109. 
 118. Rahail Ali & Imran Mufti, The Global Sukuk Market and Legal Structuring 
Considerations, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 88, at 109, 109. 
 119. Islamic financial products are generally not afforded the same tax benefits as 
traditional capital markets products, but several jurisdictions have enacted legislation that 
would level the playing field with Western securities. Ken Eglinton et al., Accounting and 
Taxation Implications of Islamic Finance Products, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 42, at 77, 84. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Ali, supra note 88, at 105–07. 
 122. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of sukuk transaction 
structures. 
 123. See supra Part I.D., which describes Dana Gas’s challenge to the purchase 
undertaking agreement on the ground that the underlying mudaraba agreement was not Sharia 
compliant. 
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A party seeking declaratory relief, either for excuse from performance or 
for a statement of its right to expect performance, must avail itself of the 
judicial system.124  If a court were to adjudicate a dispute arising from a 
Western financing arrangement, justiciability would likely not pose a 
significant barrier.  For parties involved in an Islamic financing arrangement, 
however, justiciability may be an insurmountable hurdle to ascertaining the 
rights of the parties, particularly under New York law.  The dispute centers 
on whether the subject matter of the agreement for which the parties 
negotiated, a Sharia-compliant financial product, exists and, if it does not 
exist, whether that excuses the parties’ performance obligations under the 
agreements.  To determine whether a transaction’s subject matter exists, the 
court must resolve the question of whether a financial product is Sharia 
compliant.  Thus, the crux of the dispute is a religious question.  As such, a 
court must determine whether the dispute is justiciable without running afoul 
of the Establishment Clause.125 
Part II.A examines the Establishment Clause issues that would arise if a 
court sought to determine the compliance of sukuk transaction documents 
with Sharia law.  Part II.B examines possible outcomes if a court were to 
minimize the religious question of Sharia compliance and attempt to 
adjudicate the claim on neutral principles of law. 
A.  Establishment Clause Bars to Adjudication 
Certainly, it is not unprecedented for American courts to apply foreign 
laws that codify religious laws.126  Nevertheless, when adjudicating matters 
governed by domestic laws, New York courts have determined that the First 
Amendment prohibits a civil court from deciding religious disputes because 
doing so would violate the Establishment Clause and entangle the state in a 
religious dispute.127  This entanglement results from a court’s de facto 
endorsement of a group with a particular religious belief.128  Determining the 
 
 124. See Janet Elaine Curry & Theodore Z. Wyman, Annotation, Further Relief Sought in 
Declaratory Judgment Action, 10 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 23:65 (2018). 
 125. See infra notes 129–31 for a discussion of justiciability. 
 126. See, e.g., Saudi Basic Indus. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 31 (Del. 
2005) (discussing the trial court’s review of over 1000 pages of expert deposition testimony 
and nine expert reports on Islamic scholarship delineating the elements of the Saudi cause of 
action); Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 887, 893 (Tex. 2000) (affirming summary 
judgment against the plaintiff after relying on expert testimony that the Afghani legal system 
was based on Islamic law and that Islamic law does not recognize causes of action for tortious 
interference). 
 127. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (N.Y. 
2007) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 696 (1976)).  The 
First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  This prohibition has been incorporated against the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).  Therefore, 
New York state courts will decide religion-related disputes in accordance with the U.S. 
Constitution and relevant case law. Contra, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 
1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment does not 
apply to the states). 
 128. Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1284. 
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prevailing party in a religious dispute requires a court to credit one party’s 
religious interpretation and dismiss the other party’s interpretation as 
incorrect.129  In doing so, a court impermissibly puts itself in the position of 
declaring the “correct” practice of a religion.130  If, therefore, resolution of a 
matter would require a court to rule on religious doctrines or practices, that 
dispute is nonjusticiable even though the court may otherwise retain subject 
matter jurisdiction.131  As the New York Court of Appeals noted, however, 
if the court can resolve the claim based on “objective, well-established 
principles of secular law,” a religious matter is justiciable.132 
New York courts have long been troubled by the state and federal 
constitutional implications of resolving disputes that require the 
interpretation of religious doctrines.133  Courts have consistently held that it 
is inappropriate for a fact finder to interpret or apply religious requirements 
to decide whether religious law has been violated.134  Explaining the 
rationale of the prohibition, the New York Court of Appeals stated, “[C]ivil 
courts are forbidden from interfering in or determining religious disputes.  
Such rulings violate the First Amendment because they simultaneously 
establish one religious belief as correct . . . while interfering with the 
opposing faction’s beliefs.”135  If resolution of a matter requires a 
determination of religious doctrines or practices, the court will decline to hear 
the dispute.136 
Not all interactions between church and state are de facto violations of the 
Establishment Clause.137  Rather, each instance must be evaluated for the 
scope of entanglement.138  When determining whether it will violate the 
 
 129. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718–20 (admonishing the Illinois Supreme Court for 
evaluating competing testimony from religious experts on internal ecclesiastical procedures). 
 130. See id. at 721 (finding that the Illinois Supreme Court substituted its own interpretation 
of religious procedural law in place of the proper religious hierarchical authorities). 
 131. See Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1282 (holding that the court could not decide 
an internal election dispute between members of the Jewish congregation because resolution 
required application of the Jewish ecclesiastical principles); Drake v. Moulton Mem’l Baptist 
Church of Newburgh, 940 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282–83 (App. Div. 2012) (affirming the dismissal 
of the complaint on grounds that adjudication required the court to impermissibly delve into 
internal issues such as church leadership, direction, doctrine, discipline, and control); cf. 
Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish, 146 N.E.2d 
685, 687 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that the application of Episcopalian canon law did not require 
the court to decide matters of doctrine). 
 132. Congregation Yetev, 879 N.E.2d at 1285; see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 
(noting that courts may not resolve underlying religious doctrinal disputes when adjudicating 
disputes between religious parties or regarding religious property). 
 133. Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (N.Y. 2001) (citing New York case law 
holding that courts cannot interpret religious doctrine under the federal constitution); S. S. & 
B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 285 N.Y.S. 879, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1936) 
(noting the prohibition of judicial interpretation of ecclesiastical laws under New York law). 
 134. Lightman, 761 N.E.2d at 1033. 
 135. First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 
464 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1984) (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. 
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 136. See supra note 131. 
 137. Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 36 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 138. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). 
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Establishment Clause, a court must determine whether state action “fosters 
excessive state entanglement with religion.”139  This inquiry involves 
examining the benefitting institution’s character and purposes and the 
resulting relationship between the government and any religious authority.140  
An interaction becomes an excessive entanglement at the point where state 
action has “the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”141 
Resolving a dispute regarding an Islamic financial agreement’s Sharia 
compliance would require a court to rule on doctrinal matters of Islam.  The 
Establishment Clause creates a barrier between church and state that ensures 
the government does not favor one religion or denomination over another.142  
Because this principle is a cornerstone of American democracy, it is clear 
that a state should not be allowed to adjudicate religious doctrinal matters, 
even in a commercial context.  With each ruling, the courts would manifest 
a preference for one interpretation within a religion over another.  This 
situation would be no different than if a state enacted legislation that 
preferred Baptists to Lutherans or Episcopalians to Roman Catholics.  If such 
preferences were to become entrenched through stare decisis, the 
Establishment Clause’s protection against injustice—or religious 
persecution—would be moot.143 
This concern is particularly heightened for Islamic disputes.  Unlike the 
Vatican in Roman Catholicism or denominational organizations in American 
Protestantism, Islam has no central religious authority and, therefore, no 
standardization in practice.144  Thus, a court would need to develop a deep 
understanding of Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence to render a decision, 
which would make the court’s determination wholly discretionary.  The state 
would be declaring what it means to commercially abide by the tenets of a 
faith.  Apart from declaring a state religion or criminalizing the practice of a 
religion, it is difficult to imagine a state entanglement more excessive than 
declaring the elements of proper religious practice. 
B.  The Religious-Question Loophole:  Neutral Principles of Law 
Although New York courts cannot resolve religious doctrinal disputes, a 
court may resolve disputes that touch religion if the matter can be adjudicated 
 
 139. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 425 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis added).  Such entanglements may be substantive and require the state to choose 
between competing religious or procedural views where the state and church are in a legal 
dispute with one another. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 140. Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)). 
 141. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997). 
 142. See Commack Self-Serv., 294 F.3d at 425. 
 143. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 803–06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the four purposes of the Establishment Clause:  to (1) guarantee the individual 
right to conscience, (2) prevent state interference in the autonomy of religious life, (3) prevent 
the trivialization and degradation of religion by being too closely involved with secular 
government, and (4) ensure that religion does not become the basis of political battles). 
 144. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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based on neutral principles of law.145  Consider a hypothetical lawsuit in 
which a sukuk issuer seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, 
alleging that industry standards reveal that the existing sukuk transaction is 
not Sharia compliant and the parties’ previous understanding of the 
transaction’s compliance constitutes a mutual mistake of fact warranting 
rescission of the agreement.  Instead of diving into the question of Sharia 
compliance, a court could first decide whether the transaction’s 
noncompliance, if taken as fact, would excuse performance, without deciding 
the merits of the fund’s alleged noncompliance with Sharia law.146 
On a motion to dismiss, the veracity of a well-pled complaint’s factual 
allegations is immaterial to the court’s ruling.147  Thus, if a sukuk holder filed 
a motion to dismiss, the court would not need to determine the fact of 
compliance to decide the motion.  On a motion to dismiss, a New York court 
will liberally construe the pleading148 and “accept the facts as alleged in the 
complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable 
inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any 
cognizable legal theory.”149  This standard, set forth in New York’s Civil 
Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR) 3211, finds its federal counterpart in Rule 
8(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which states that a 
federal court cannot dismiss a complaint unless “it is clear that no relief could 
be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the 
allegations.”150 
If a court eliminated the question of Sharia compliance in evaluating a 
motion to dismiss and applied neutral principles of law, it would consider 
whether the sukuk’s noncompliance excuses performance on a theory of 
mistake of fact.151  Under New York law, a mutual mistake of fact generally 
renders a contract voidable and subject to rescission, so long as the mistaken 
fact is substantial and existed at the time the contract was executed.152  A 
court will order relief on these grounds only in exceptional situations.153  To 
prevail on this claim, a mistaken fact must be so material that it goes to the 
 
 145. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1284 (N.Y. 
2007). 
 146. Indeed, this is the manner in which the English courts decided the Dana Gas litigation. 
 147. When considering a motion to dismiss, courts will presume a complaint’s factual 
allegations are true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Leon v. Martinez, 638 
N.E.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. 1994). 
 148. Leon, 638 N.E.2d at 513 (applying New York’s Civil Practice Laws and Rules (CPLR) 
3211, which governs motions to dismiss). 
 149. Id. at 512–13. 
 150. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513–14 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King 
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f). 
 151. A claim for mistake of fact should not be confused with a claim for mistake of law, 
which likely could not be asserted.  Neither New York law nor federal law recognizes Sharia 
as a binding system of law.  Furthermore, even if Sharia law was recognized as binding, a 
mistake of law claim cannot be asserted on the basis of a subsequent change in law. Anita 
Founds., Inc. v. ILGWU Nat’l Ret. Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 207–09 (1973)). 
 152. Gould v. Bd. of Educ., 616 N.E.2d 142, 146 (N.Y. 1993). 
 153. Simkin v. Blank, 968 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y. 2012). 
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foundation of the agreement and constitutes a basic assumption of the 
contract.154  In other words, it must “vitally affect the basis upon which the 
parties contract”155 such that the mistake precluded a meeting of the minds 
requisite to form an agreement.156  In determining the existence of a mutual 
mistake of fact, a court applies an objective test.157 
Given the intricacies and purpose of the Islamic finance industry, the 
transaction’s compliance with Sharia law could constitute a basic assumption 
of the agreement that would vitally affect a meeting of the minds.  If a court 
were to determine whether a mutual mistake of fact occurred, it would first 
need to determine whether the parties were mistaken about the transaction’s 
compliance with Sharia law at the time the sukuk transaction documents were 
executed.  In most instances, it would be fairly clear that the parties intended 
to enter into a Sharia-compliant agreement158 as sukuk transaction documents 
contain several references to Sharia compliance and fatwas obtained by the 
originator confirming a belief that the transaction complies with Sharia 
law.159 
Even if a court were to find that these tenets of Sharia law and attendant 
fatwas were improperly applied, it would then have to find that mistaken 
reliance on these principles was material.160  To evaluate the materiality of a 
mistaken fact, a court looks to whether the party would have been able to act 
on the basis of the alleged mistaken fact.161  In Simkin v. Blank,162 for 
example, the plaintiff sought reformation of a marital settlement agreement 
on the basis of mutual mistake of fact.163  At the time the settlement 
agreement was executed, the plaintiff’s assets included a brokerage account 
worth approximately $5.4 million, which was managed by Bernie Madoff.164  
The discovery of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme revealed that the account and its 
assets were illegitimate.165  The plaintiff alleged that he and his ex-wife were 
mutually mistaken as to the existence of a legitimate brokerage account and 
that his true assets were less valuable than previously believed.166  On that 
basis, he sought reformation of the assets awarded to his ex-wife in the 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Gould, 616 N.E.2d at 146. 
 157. Ryan v. Boucher, 534 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App. Div. 1988). 
 158. But see Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 463 (noting that the contested agreement did not 
indicate intent to transact on the basis of the alleged mistaken fact). 
 159. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., BASE PROSPECTUS cover page, i, 22, 226 (2017), 
http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/Base%20Prospectus_7418c363-8ae7-4d0a-9c55-c5c6dcb 
ee14f.PDF [https://perma.cc/U2XX-W6E8]. 
 160. Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 463. 
 161. See id. at 464. 
 162. 968 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2012). 
 163. Id. at 460. 
 164. Id. at 461. 
 165. Id.  For general information about Bernie Madoff’s $60 billion Ponzi scheme, see 
Diana B. Henriques, Bernie Madoff’s Essential Man, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/magazine/bernie-madoffs-essential-man.html 
[https://perma.cc/UCJ8-T5BY]. 
 166. Simkin, 968 N.E.2d at 461. 
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divorce.167  The court held a mutual mistake regarding the existence of the 
account would be found only if the parties would not have been able to act 
upon the account—namely, whether the parties could have liquidated the 
account prior to the discovery of the Ponzi scheme.168  Because the ex-
husband was, at one time, able to draw on the account, the court held that 
there was no mistake of fact regarding the existence of the brokerage account 
at the time of the agreement.169 
If the Simkin holding was applied in a lawsuit alleging mutual mistake of 
fact regarding a sukuk transaction’s alleged noncompliance with Sharia law, 
the question would be whether the parties could have acted on the basis of 
presumed compliance with Sharia law.  Surely, the answer would be yes.  
The very act of issuing sukuk certificates indicates that the parties are able to 
act on the basis of believed Sharia compliance:  obtaining assurances of 
Sharia compliance, issuing and purchasing sukuk certificates, purchasing the 
underlying assets, and distributing and receiving periodic payments.  
Therefore, it is likely that, applying New York law, a court would not find 
mutual mistake of fact and would not excuse performance, despite 
subsequent reservations that the transaction does not comport with religious 
law. 
Further, a New York court will not apply the doctrine of mutual mistake 
of fact where the party seeking rescission could have, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, ascertained the truth of the fact prior to consummation of the 
transaction.170  Before the issuance of any sukuk, the originator’s and issuer’s 
Sharia supervisory boards confirm that the transaction complies with Sharia 
law, which is documented in the prospectus.171  Investors are generally 
encouraged to consult their own Sharia experts to determine compliance.172  
If the parties to a transaction followed the industry norm for sukuk issuances 
and reached their own conclusions regarding the compliance of the 
transaction prior to executing the transaction documents, it is unlikely New 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 464. 
 169. Id. 
 170. P.K. Dev., Inc. v. Elvem Dev. Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (App. Div. 1996). 
 171. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226 (listing the Sharia supervisory 
boards who approved the transaction structure).  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requires an issuer conducting a registered offering to provide investors with a 
prospectus, which contains information about the total number of certificates issued, the 
offering price, fund objectives, investment strategies, risks, fund management, and fees and 
expenses. See Information Available to Investment Company Shareholders, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmfinfo 
htm.html#prospectus [https://perma.cc/66BG-7CKS] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).  Although 
certain exemptions may permit an issuer to conduct a private placement, such issuers generally 
provide a private placement memorandum, which contains information similar to that 
contained in a prospectus. Investor Bulletin:  Private Placements Under Regulation D, 
INVESTOR.GOV (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/ 
alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-private-placements-under [https://perma.cc/U2C3-7D9Z]. 
 172. See, e.g., KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226 (“Certificateholders . . . should 
consult their own Shari’ah advisers as to whether the proposed transaction . . . is in 
compliance with their individual standards of compliance with Shari’ah principles.”). 
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York law would permit an equitable rescission of the contract based on a 
theory that the parties were mistaken as to the fact of the transaction’s 
compliance with Islamic law.173 
Even assuming the mistaken-fact claim survived a motion to dismiss, the 
Establishment Clause would definitively bar any further adjudication on the 
religious question, leaving the issuer with a hollow victory.174  Although a 
motion to dismiss accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, prevailing on 
the merits of the religious question would require the fact finder to credit the 
allegations of noncompliance after interpreting Islamic doctrine.  Attempting 
to do so triggers the Establishment Clause and renders the dispute 
nonjusticiable.  Thus, the current state of the law places plaintiffs alleging 
religion-based claims between a rock and a hard place.  The court will:  
(1) dismiss the complaint as meritless; (2) dismiss the complaint as 
nonjusticiable, thereby withholding a judicial remedy from the plaintiff; or 
(3) minimize the religious question to the detriment of the parties. 
III.  PROPOSALS FOR LIMITED INTEGRATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
That courts will dismiss a commercial claim on grounds that it presents a 
nonjusticiable religious question is deeply dissatisfying.  Under the status 
quo of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, courts will resolve property 
disputes between religious parties because the state has a legitimate interest 
in adjudicating such disputes where a civil court is the appropriate forum.175  
Similarly, New York has a legitimate interest in resolving commercial 
contract disputes, and a civil court is an appropriate forum for resolution of 
contract disputes.176  New York’s interest is not diminished even though the 
dispute touches religion.  Further, unlike the ecclesiastical organizations 
usually involved in religious property disputes, the parties to a sukuk 
transaction are entities that are not part of a hierarchical body with 
established doctrines and laws for dispute resolution.  As the parties lack an 
organized avenue for resolution, New York arguably has a greater interest in 
resolving the dispute, yet the law currently offers no satisfactory relief to 
these parties. 
Though some have argued that the First Amendment should not be 
incorporated against the states,177 the U.S. Supreme Court is unlikely to 
 
 173. In a way, this mirrors the English court’s rationale in determining that the risk of 
noncompliance had been allocated to a specific party.  The idea of allocating all the risk to 
one party directly contradicts the Islamic risk-sharing model, in which all parties bear the loss. 
See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 174. As a matter of public policy and resource allocation, it remains an open question 
whether a court would undertake an extensive analysis of any claims on a motion to dismiss.  
Whether the court grants or denies the motion, the result is dismissal of a complaint containing 
a religious question. 
 175. See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in 
the U.S., 464 N.E.2d 454, 458–60 (N.Y. 1984). 
 176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra note 127; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment should not be incorporated against 
the states); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
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reverse decades of state-related Establishment Clause precedent.178  The 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is firmly entrenched in federal and 
state court decisions and the fundamental societal norm of separation of 
church and state.179  Since the Court’s position on judicial adjudication of 
religious disputes is unlikely to change, this Note proposes alternatives for 
parties to an Islamic finance agreement who seek judicial remedies under 
New York law.  Part III.A proposes a legislative remedy applicable in both 
state and federal courts, while Part III.B highlights court-sanctioned 
extrajudicial alternatives currently available to contracting parties who wish 
to execute agreements that may present nonjusticiable religious questions. 
A.  Certification of Religious Questions 
Like most states, New York has a procedure for the certification of 
questions of state law to the state’s highest court.180  The New York Court of 
Appeals will consider questions certified by federal circuit courts, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, or the highest court of another state and will resolve issues 
of law that are outcome determinative and for which no controlling precedent 
exists.181  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit generates the 
 
concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Permitting state courts to adjudicate religious disputes would arguably further New York’s 
interest in resolving contract disputes that arise under New York law, provide a judicial forum 
for resolution of all contract disputes, and further New York’s interest in being the preferred 
choice of law in commercial agreements. See supra notes 11, 112–15 and accompanying text.  
However, the practical implications of researching religious doctrine and packaging its 
intricacies into understandable expert witness testimony or jury instructions, tasking a fact 
finder with applying those instructions, and the effects of stare decisis weigh heavily against 
permitting a secular court to interpret religious doctrine.  Further, concerns about the timeline 
and cost of litigation caution against secular adjudication of religious disputes.  See Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 31–32 (Del. 2005) (noting 
that a court tasked with determining the elements of a Saudi cause of action undertook months 
of Islamic studies, hired its own expert witness who traveled to Saudi Arabia for further 
research, and read over 1000 pages of expert witness deposition testimony and nine expert 
reports before issuing its ruling); Andrew White, Dispute Resolution and Specialized ADR for 
Islamic Finance, in ISLAMIC FINANCE:  LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 42, at 306, 314 (noting 
that even basic, fundamental principles of Islamic law are elusive to Western legal scholars 
who lack expertise). 
 178. The incorporation of the First Amendment against the states was articulated as early 
as 1940. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  Even if the Establishment 
Clause was not incorporated against the states, New York law bars the adjudication of 
religious disputes.  See S. S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 285 
N.Y.S. 879, 890 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (holding that New York courts would not “assume to dictate 
or to interpret ecclesiastical doctrine” (quoting Harlem Church of Seventh Day Adventists v. 
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 260 N.Y.S. 517, 522 (Sup. Ct. 1932), rev’d 
on other grounds, 280 N.Y.S. 828 (App. Div. 1935), modified, 198 N.E. 615 (N.Y. 1935) (per 
curiam))). 
 179. See Green, supra note 8, at 443. 
 180. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(9); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(a) 
(2018). 
 181. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(9).  The Court of Appeals may also consider certified 
questions submitted indirectly by federal district courts through 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which 
allows district courts to certify issues of state law to federal appellate courts, which may then 
certify the question to the N.Y. Court of Appeals. ADVISORY GRP. TO THE N.Y. STATE & FED. 
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majority of the certification requests for the New York Court of Appeals and 
has a mechanism in place that allows certification upon either the request of 
a party or sua sponte.182  Regardless of whether a party’s certification request 
is accepted or rejected, there is no formal procedure for a party to appeal the 
decision, although it may submit letters supporting or opposing 
certification.183 
Similar legislation and procedures could be enacted to permit the 
certification of religious questions to a religious tribunal.184  A tribunal 
would then render an opinion on the religious question, which would decide 
the matter for the secular court without requiring the judiciary to delve into 
doctrinal matters.  Since a court could not designate a religious tribunal on 
its own, the parties would need to agree to certify the religious questions to a 
tribunal.185  The parties could include a provision in the transaction 
agreements designating a tribunal and its members or a process for choosing 
a tribunal and its members.  A provision that designates a tribunal would not 
be substantially different than an arbitration provision that designates an 
organization from which an arbitration panel may be chosen, such as the 
American Arbitration Association.  As this would be a secular provision of 
the agreement, a court need not be troubled by entanglement concerns.186  
Alternatively, a tribunal could be chosen during the pretrial case-
management process.  Many courts require parties to mediate before 
 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PRACTICE HANDBOOK ON CERTIFICATION OF STATE LAW QUESTIONS BY THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT TO THE NEW YORK STATE COURT 
OF APPEALS 6 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ADVISORY GRP.], https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/ 
forms/certhandbk.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7BU-B245] . 
 182. See id. at 2. 
 183. Id. at 10. 
 184. This Note acknowledges the difficulties that may be associated with enacting this 
proposed legislative remedy particularly at the federal level, given recent anti-Sharia 
sentiments in state legislatures. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2018) (“No court . . . may 
enforce any provisions of any religious code.”); Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court order granting a preliminary injunction to prevent 
certification of the results of a voter-approved constitutional amendment that would prevent 
Oklahoma courts from applying international or Sharia law); H.B. 2582, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (proposed legislation prohibiting the judicial application of foreign law or 
ratification of any private agreement based on foreign or religious law, including Sharia law, 
canon law, Halacha, and karma); see also State Legislation Restricting Judicial Consideration 
of Foreign or Religious Law, 2010–2012, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/State-legislation-
restricting-foreign-or-religious-law1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LDE-BHYF] (noting that 
between 2010 and 2012, thirty-two states introduced ninety-two bills restricting judicial 
consideration of religious law).  New York has not introduced similar anti-religious-
determination legislation.  However, proposed legislation that would create a sukuk investment 
vehicle known as an alternative finance instrument bond has died in committee each session. 
See, e.g., S.B. 3637, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
 185. Court-designated religious tribunals would likely pose the same Establishment Clause 
issues as judicial interpretations of religious law and promote the beliefs of one religious 
tribunal over another. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 186. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138–39 (N.Y. 1983) (finding that neither law nor 
public policy prevented the court from enforcing the secular terms of a religious agreement). 
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continuing the litigation.187  In the same way that a mediator is not selected 
until the case is referred to mediation, a tribunal need not be designated until 
the court certifies a religious question.188 
Just as the New York Court of Appeals retains jurisdiction over whether 
to accept or reject a certification request, a religious tribunal would retain the 
right to reject a court’s request.189  Under such circumstances, a court may 
permit the parties to select a different tribunal that would accept the 
certification request, or a court may dismiss the case as nonjusticiable 
because denial of the certification request leaves a court with no path to 
adjudication without violating the Establishment Clause.190 
Like any extrajudicial adjudicatory process, certification requests present 
some concerns.191  First, there is no guarantee that a religious tribunal would 
be willing to accept a certification request from a secular court.  Such 
organizations may prefer that parties present disputes directly to the tribunal 
for full adjudication, not merely the certified question.  Certainly, if religious 
tribunals abstain from certifying requests, devout parties would have no 
choice but to appear before such tribunals for adjudication of their disputes 
because resolution would otherwise be unavailable.192  While this furthers 
the parties’ interest in having matters adjudicated according to their religious 
beliefs, it undermines a state’s interest in resolving disputes that arise within 
its borders, under its laws, and involving its citizens.193  Particularly as 
applicable to Islamic finance, this outcome would undermine New York’s 
interest in adjudicating commercial disputes, as devout parties would have 
no incentive to include New York in choice-of-law or forum-selection 
provisions.194  This would weaken New York’s position as a commercial 
center in the financial industry, even as the Islamic finance industry continues 
to grow. 
 
 187. See S.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. § 83.9(d) (requiring parties to eligible cases to consider 
mediation and report to the court the perceived usefulness of mediation to resolve the dispute); 
N.Y. COMMERCIAL DIV. N.Y. CTY. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. 3 (stating that the 
presiding justice refers a case for mediation by order of reference); Administrative Order (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ComDiv/NY/PDFs/AO-Mand 
Medshort42017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG26-P4YP] (ordering mandatory mediation for all 
commercial disputes filed outside the Commercial Division). 
 188. See Procedures of the Mediation Program, U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y. 
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/mediation/Mediation%20Program%20 
Procedures.12.9.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4PE-L5L5]. 
 189. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 22, § 500.27(d) (2018) (implying that the 
acceptance of certified questions is a discretionary decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals). 
 190. See supra Part II. 
 191. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of problems inherent in ADR. 
 192. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of extrajudicial resolutions. 
 193. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (listing the public 
interests in a diversity case, which include local interest in deciding localized controversies at 
home, conducting a trial in a forum at home with the law governing the dispute, and ensuring 
jurors have an interest in the case when completing jury duty). 
 194. See supra notes 11, 112–15 and accompanying text. 
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Second, certification lengthens the timeline of litigation.195  A court has 
an administrative interest in clearing its docket.  Certification removes some 
of a court’s power to quickly resolve disputes.196  A religious tribunal may 
be slow to accept or reject certification or render an opinion, which would 
effectively give the tribunal power to stay secular court proceedings by 
preventing a case from moving forward on the merits.197  However, this 
scenario is unlikely because religious tribunals have a vested interest in 
rendering speedy opinions.  Moreover, as the tribunals would be selected by 
the parties rather than appointed by the court, economic competition would 
motivate the tribunals to establish a reputation for issuing fair and timely 
opinions. 
Third, the scope of the questions posed for certification, and the attendant 
answers, varies widely.  The New York Court of Appeals may answer the 
certified question as framed by the requesting court or may rewrite the 
question to consider relevant state law issues.198  If religious tribunals 
followed that example, the opinion rendered may be broader than the 
question posed and may encroach on a court’s adjudication of the secular 
issues in the case.  This potential problem can be remedied by including 
language in enacting legislation that limits the scope of the opinion to the 
certified question.  Further, a court need not apply an overly broad opinion 
just as a court need not follow dicta. 
B.  Alternatives Currently Available Under New York Law 
While a legislative remedy may be ideal, it is currently unavailable for 
transacting parties.  The legislative process can be long and tedious, which 
means any legislative relief is unlikely to come quickly enough for parties 
currently grappling with these concerns.  As parties must make do with what 
is available, this Note highlights two viable options for contracting around 
the Establishment Clause:  stipulation of Sharia compliance and ADR—
specifically arbitration. 
1.  Stipulation of Sharia Compliance 
One of the most effective ways to preempt a mutual-mistake claim is to 
warrant the existence of a fact or circumstance.199  Before any sukuk 
issuance, the originator and issuer obtain a fatwa from their Sharia 
 
 195. For reference, the Court of Appeals generally renders a decision to accept or reject a 
certification request within twenty-seven days, but the average time for the court to render an 
opinion on the certified question is about seven months. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 181, at 
10. 
 196. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (recognizing that congested dockets present 
administrative problems for a court). 
 197. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 181, at 3. 
 198. See Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 222 F.3d 63, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(clarifying that the New York Court of Appeals was not limited to answering only the certified 
question). 
 199. See Dana Gas PJSC v. Dana Gas Sukuk Ltd., [2017] EWHC (Comm) 2928 [63]. 
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supervisory board declaring the sukuk Sharia compliant.200  Currently, 
warranties of compliance are disclaimed by the issuer, and investors are 
instructed to consult their own experts to determine the transaction’s 
compliance with Sharia law.201  To share the risk of a mistake, the parties 
could stipulate and mutually warrant that the transaction accords with Sharia 
law.  By entering the transaction, the parties would agree that they believe 
the transaction is Sharia compliant at the time of execution or that they are 
waiving any concerns about Sharia compliance.  If the parties memorialized 
that understanding in a binding stipulation, performance would be required 
even if market practices shift and render the transaction noncompliant with 
the revised standards.  Thus, transaction disputes would not require a court 
to delve into religious doctrine because the stipulation would have the effect 
of barring a party’s claim of avoidance due to noncompliance.  This solution 
would eliminate a court’s Establishment Clause problem and enable the court 
to adjudicate the parties’ contract claims. 
Despite the fact that this solution removes excessive entanglement for the 
judiciary, is unlikely to be a satisfying resolution for parties who truly care 
about Sharia compliance.  Parties bargain for a Sharia-compliant financial 
product and, in the process, incur additional transaction costs and forgo 
financial benefits available in Western financing because of the importance 
of Islam in their personal lives.  If evolving standards render a transaction 
noncompliant, it is unlikely that an observant Muslim would want to be 
bound to continued performance of contract obligations that knowingly 
violate Sharia law.202  A stipulation of compliance would arguably clash with 
ijtihad, which requires a de novo review of all issues, because the stipulation 
removes all further inquiry.203  By creating a prior agreement that the 
transaction will be deemed compliant, the parties prevent the requisite 
determination, pursuant to Islamic law, that the transaction is, in fact, 
compliant.  This path could create a transaction that is merely facially Sharia 
compliant.  Although stipulation is a viable alternative, it does not present an 
ideal solution. 
2.  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
As in cases involving Jewish law, the parties could submit their dispute to 
the authority of an extrajudicial forum for resolution.204  To do so, the 
transaction agreements would need to include a provision mandating that 
religious questions be decided through an agreed-upon form of ADR.  To the 
extent that parties seek judicial resolution of religious questions, a court 
 
 200. See supra notes 159, 171–72 and accompanying text. 
 201. KSA SUKUK LTD., supra note 159, at 226. 
 202. In a situation where there is bilateral agreement about noncompliance, the parties 
could agree to release each other from continued obligations or restructure the transaction to 
align with revised standards, but that is not addressed in this Note. 
 203. Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 18. 
 204. See, e.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138–39 (N.Y. 1983) (enforcing parties’ 
prenuptial agreement to appear before a religious tribunal); Helfand, supra note 1, at 1247–49 
(discussing trends in Jewish arbitration). 
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could enforce an extrajudicial forum’s resolution of the religious question.205  
Contracting around the Establishment Clause in this manner would best serve 
the parties’ needs and protect the judiciary’s integrity.  Most importantly for 
New York, this approach frees courts of a potential excessive religious 
entanglement.206  Courts would be called upon to adjudicate secular 
provisions of an agreement in accordance with secular law, not religious 
questions.207  Further, courts could enforce a tribunal’s determination as a 
secular provision of the parties’ original agreement, subject to public 
policy.208 
An extrajudicial forum would best serve the needs of the parties to conduct 
their commercial transactions in accordance with Sharia law.209  By 
preselecting a tribunal or arbiter, the parties could choose an adjudicatory 
authority known to adhere to a particular set of religious beliefs.  Given the 
variance within Islamic scholarship across schools of thought, the parties 
could agree to have matters decided by a tribunal comprised of scholars that 
best reflect the parties’ beliefs.210  The parties could choose to have the matter 
decided by certain prominent Islamic scholars or their local imams.211  If 
desired, the parties could agree to have the religious tribunal decide all 
matters of breach and awards to ensure that all components of the dispute 
resolution process adhere to Sharia law.212 
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It is possible that allowing a religious tribunal to decide the entire dispute 
would jeopardize the correct application of New York law because the 
tribunal may have differing interests from secular law.213  Further, courts are 
highly deferential toward arbitral awards and will modify or vacate awards 
only on narrow grounds.214  These problems are, however, not unique to 
religious arbitration and are present in any arbitral proceeding, and there 
remains a strong push for arbitration in secular disputes nevertheless.215 
Importantly, New York courts will not enforce arbitration decisions that 
contravene public policy.  Consequently, there are safeguards in place to 
ensure that arbitral decisions do not greatly disadvantage the parties.216  And 
even if the tribunal only decided matters of Sharia compliance, the parties 
would benefit from a forum that renders decisions consistent with Sharia law, 
which makes this solution the most feasible—and beneficial—option 
currently available.217 
CONCLUSION 
New York law has a strong interest in adjudicating disputes appropriate 
for resolution in a judicial forum, including Islamic commercial disputes.  
The Establishment Clause, however, presents an impenetrable bar to the 
adjudication of matters that require a court to determine religious doctrine.  
Such rulings would result in courts preferencing one religious interpretation 
over another and would create an excessive religious entanglement that 
violates the First Amendment.  Absent legislative intervention that would 
permit a court to certify religious questions to a tribunal, the parties to an 
Islamic commercial agreement should consider contracting around the 
Establishment Clause by stipulating to a transaction’s compliance or directly 
submitting to the jurisdiction of an extrajudicial forum capable of deciding 
religious disputes in a manner consistent with the parties’ beliefs.  The 
resulting extrajudicial determination would generally be enforceable by a 
secular court, which could still hear claims relating to the secular provisions 
of the agreement.  Failure to contract around the Establishment Clause 
exposes the parties to the risk of being denied a remedy for breach of contract, 
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whether declaratory, injunctive, or monetary, or granted a remedy that does 
not address the heart of the dispute, which would ultimately hinder the 
growth of the Islamic finance industry in the United States. 
